Media Worlds

Anthropology on New Terrain

EDITED BY

Faye D. Ginsburg,
Lila Abu-Lughod,
and Brian Larkin

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley Los Angeles London

University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.
London, England

© 2002 by the Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Media worlds : anthropology on new terrain / edited by Faye D. Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-520-22448-5 (Cloth : alk. paper)—
ISBN 0-520-23231-3 (Paper : alk. paper)
1. Mass media and culture. I. Ginsburg, Faye D.
II. Abu-Lughod, Lila. III. Larkin, Brian.
P94.6 .M426 2002
302.23—dc21

2002002312

Manufactured in the United States of America
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R 1997) *(Permanence of Paper)*.⊗

4

Spectacles of Difference

Cultural Activism and the Mass Mediation of Tibet

Meg McLagan

Recently a friend of mine gave me a photograph taken in the Sixty-sixth Street subway station on the West Side of Manhattan. Someone had spray-painted "Free Derry" and below it "Free Tibet" on the wall, graphically linking these two modern-day anticolonial liberation struggles on different sides of the globe. At the same time, I remembered an advertisement I had seen around the city publicizing FreePhone.com's "free long-distance calling over the Internet," which contained the phrase "Free Tibet" in large white letters against a black background and the suggestion, "Call your best friend in Lhasa for free while he still has the oxygen to talk." Above this, a cartoon of a multiply pierced hipster mouthing the word "Yak." These two images reveal a movement pinned between two opposing, and at times complementary, processes—politicization and commodification.

The debates among and between Tibet activists and the public relations experts hired to help them illustrate some of the ways in which contemporary intercultural social movements have tried to negotiate a path between these two poles of mass-mediated activism. As the Tibet issue has expanded and become part of a much wider political imagination, this kind of symbolic work has become central to the Movement's existence, but not without some concern about what effect the objectification of Tibetan culture in the mass media might have. To better understand how this problematic relationship to media is negotiated in social practice this essay examines some of the dilemmas that emerged around the participation and public presentation of "Tibet celebrities" (the Dalai Lama and Richard Gere, among others) during the "Year of Tibet," a transnational political campaign mounted by activists in 1991–92.

The Tibet case rests on a century-long process in which democratic politics have been transformed by the emergence of mass communication, beginning with newspapers, then radio, and eventually television in the 1950s, which deepened and accelerated this trend. Since then, the political arena has been made over in light of the techniques and imperatives of this new medium, with images and spectacle becoming central to the definitions and meanings of legitimacy in politics, a fact well documented by a wide range of scholars (e.g., Boorstin 1961; Altschull 1995; Meyrowitz 1985; Marshall 1997). Although tactical image-making and political spectacle are nothing new (see, e.g., Burke 1992; Foucault 1979), the extent to which promotion has penetrated the heart of the political process in the West over the past four decades is unprecedented. As communicative strategies and public relations expertise have migrated from the entertainment industries to the organization of politics, boundaries between the domains of popular culture and political culture have become blurred (Marshall 1997). The result has been a widening of the spaces in which politics can be conceived and performed.

From the point of view of intercultural human rights concerns, this shift has intersected with another important development: the late twentieth-century rise of culturalist movements or "postnational" social formations (Appadurai 1996), which are based on the deliberate, strategic, and populist mobilization of "cultural material" in their struggle with states. Such movements signal the emergence of a "metacultural" framework in which culture becomes a necessary and favored idiom of political mobilization (Turner 1993: 423; see also Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Fox and Starn 1997). The convergence of these two historical processes has led to the production of a form of political activism that trades heavily on the mass-mediated performance of cultural difference. It is a mode of mobilization that combines cultural spectacle, celebrity, and media to powerful effect, one that has become an increasingly significant means through which diasporic, indigenous, and other marginalized groups make political claims and construct their collective identities in the post–cold war era (e.g., see McLagan 1996; Turner, this volume; Conklin 1995; and Myers 1994).

The strategic objectification of culture for political purposes in the mass media is not without contradiction. Reliance on essentialized images of difference taps into a discourse of "otherness" that can deny social actors their historical agency and contemporaneity. Nowhere is the dilemma this contradiction poses for activists more clearly illustrated than in the case of the Tibet Movement, which over the past decade has depended heavily on "New Age Orientalist" representations of Tibet as Shangri-la in order to transform popular fascination with Tibetan Buddhism into grassroots political support (see Lopez 1994).

Tibet's emergence as a fashionable cause in the United States and Europe is largely due to the skillful staging of spectacles of Tibetan cultural and religious difference epitomized by the Year of Tibet campaign. Although spectacle is often a part of mobilization in any society, whether religious or political, the meanings of such spectacles become destabilized when they are mobilized cross-culturally.[1] The Year of Tibet events that took place in New York City in October 1991 entailed the production of a variety of spectacles—from an eight-day tantric initiation given by the Dalai Lama in Madison Square Garden's Paramount Theater to a huge exhibition of Buddhist art (including a VIP opening night attended by the Dalai Lama) to cultural performances by dancing, chanting, sand mandala–making monks in venues around the city. In mounting these kinds of spectacles, activists evoked a whole domain of cross-cultural knowledge, the meaning of which had to be managed for the media as well as the largely non-Tibetan, non-Buddhist public to whom Year of Tibet events were advertised.

Recent social movement theory emphasizes that movements are always actively engaged in the production and management of meaning—for participants, for antagonists, for observers. That is, movements self-consciously struggle to fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts, everyday symbolic work that political scientists call "framing."[2] Most of the research on framing, however, focuses on formal modes of representation—speeches and writings of activists—rather than on social process such as the internal debates through which particular "frames" are produced.

I address this gap in this chapter, focusing on the Kalachakra initiation given by the Dalai Lama and the debates behind the scenes among activists (both Tibetan and non-Tibetan) and public relations experts over how to frame it. These meetings, which constitute the ethnographic core of this essay, point toward a central problematic inherent in this form of activism, generated by the tension between the hard political goals of Tibetans in exile and the means by which they have been projected in the mainstream American public sphere. While the conflation of cultural spectacle, celebrity, and media has succeeded in garnering a lot of public attention for the Tibet issue, Barnett and others have argued that it has also evacuated the issue of its political content and contributed to its banalization (see Barnett 1998). My analysis of internal discussions of the management of the Kalachakra challenges this conclusion by attending to how Tibetan activists themselves construct the efficacy of such spectacles and the media coverage they generate.

Managing meaning across boundaries of cultural difference is a complex social process, made more difficult by the fact that social formations are inherently unstable.[3] To compound that, activists rarely agree on strategies, methods, or even ultimate goals because heterogeneous social movements may be and are based on different principles than those that prevail in the West—for example, those organized around Buddhism or Islam that do not readily conform to mainstream American media frames that attempt to separate religious and political domains.

Contemporary theorizing about mass media tends to be ethnocentric in that it usually focuses on mainstream political topics in Western liberal democratic societies such as the role of advertising and spin doctors in electoral campaigns.[4] Little ethnographic work has been done that explores how cross-cultural political actors acquire their knowledge of mass media in the course of their activism—how they learn to insert themselves into the North American representation machinery and the translations entailed in this process. I argue that this is an important aspect of the social process that constitutes contemporary social movements and one that deserves serious analytic attention. My aim in foregrounding the discordant dimensions of the debates around the Dalai Lama's participation in the Kalachakra event, however, is not to emphasize the radical otherness of the Tibetan leader or diasporic Tibetans, but instead to understand how cultural difference is doing "new kinds of work" in the creation of alternative modes of publicity and political subjectivity in American activist and media contexts (Ortner 1997: 9).

CELEBRITIES, MONKS, AND THE MASS MEDIATION OF TIBET

The Tibet issue has not always enjoyed the widespread visibility it does at the moment. When the Dalai Lama fled Tibet in 1959, he was met at the Indian border by a crowd of international journalists eager to get a glimpse of the mysterious "god king" from the land of snows. Accounts of his escape appeared in newspapers and magazines around the world, stoking interest in the Tibetan situation, especially among anticommunists in the West. Despite this initial support, however, the issue remained a marginal one in diplomatic circles for more than two decades. A combination of factors conspired to keep Tibet off the international agenda, including cold war politics of the 1960s and later China's acceptance into the United Nations and America's rapprochement with the People's Republic of China in 1972 (see Knaus 1999).[5] During this period, the United States consistently refused to issue the Dalai Lama a visa, further limiting the American public's exposure to the Tibet issue (this despite the fact that the CIA actively supported the Tibetan guerrilla movement in the 1950s and 1960s).[6]

In the decade between the Dalai Lama's first trip to the United States in 1979 and his trip to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, the Tibet issue was transformed from a struggle of a tiny handful of exiles and their devoted Western friends into a transnational political movement. As I argue elsewhere, this change took place for several reasons, the most important of which was a decision by the Tibetan government-in-exile, based in Dharamsala, India, to wage a vigorous campaign for international support (McLagan 1996). The decision was made in consultation with a small circle of very well connected foreigners that had gradually coalesced around the Dalai Lama since 1979 and who had the political and financial means to make this happen (Goldstein 1997: 75–76; Shakya 1999: 412). Demonstrations in Lhasa, Tibet, in 1987 and 1988, which were violently repressed by Chinese forces and witnessed by Western tourists, provided Tibetan exiles with media-friendly images and stories that helped galvanize support in the U.S. Congress and various European parliaments.[7]

It is celebrity interest in Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama specifically, however, that propelled the Tibet issue into public consciousness in the 1990s to a degree that far exceeded anything activists could have dreamed of ten years earlier. When actor Richard Gere stood up at the Academy Award ceremonies in 1993 and urged China to negotiate with the Tibetan leader, he reached an estimated television audience of 1 billion people; when the Beastie Boys brought together the cream of alternative rock to perform in the Tibetan Freedom Concerts in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, they informed tens of thousands of concert-goers (and millions of MTV viewers) about human rights abuses in Tibet; when it was announced that action film star Steven Seagal had been recognized as a *tulku* (reincarnated lama), the Tibet issue was projected into the imagination of mainstream America in a very powerful way.

Richard Gere has been at the heart of celebrity interest in Tibet, as the first and most dedicated entertainment personality; his commitment had a snowball effect, attracting other celebrities and making Tibet one of the most fashionable issues in Hollywood in the 1990s.[8] In many ways, Gere as a figure embodies the tension between the ends and means of this form of activism described in the introduction. Gere is well known in the United States as the star of blockbuster films (e.g., *Pretty Woman, An Officer and a Gentleman*) and was once married to supermodel Cindy Crawford. In Tibetan circles, at least initially, Gere was known as a long-time Buddhist practitioner and student of the Dalai Lama who was also a big patron. When I visited Dharamsala in 1990 to attend a Movement conference, Gere was there. Many Tibetans remarked that they had had no idea who he was when he first approached the Dalai Lama and began donating money in the 1980s. In other words, Gere's influence within the Movement and with high Buddhist leaders (at least at the outset) came not from his celebrity status but from his recognized position as a powerful patron of the exile community to whom he had donated hundreds of thousands of dollars over the years, a fact that placed him in the important Tibetan cultural category of *sbyin-bdag*, a traditional patron-client social relation in which spiritual guidance is exchanged for material support.

Over time, however, Gere's celebrity became an important factor in his patronage of Tibetans. In 1987, Gere cofounded Tibet House, an organization dedicated to promoting Tibetan Buddhist culture in the West. Following successful tours of Tibetan monks in 1988–89 sponsored by Tibet House, Gere decided to organize a year-long series of similar kinds of performances in sites around the world. His success in realizing his vision for the Year of Tibet both reveals his dedication to the Tibet issue and suggests how much power celebrities can wield in activist contexts. For instance, Gere managed to bring together the spiritual heads of the different Buddhist and Bon lineages to give a total of fifteen days of teachings and initiations in Madison Square Garden's Paramount Theater (the Dalai Lama is the head of the Gelugpa lineage; the others include Nyingma, Kagyu, and Sakya; all of them are based in India). It was a remarkable and unprecedented feat in Tibetan history that required equal amounts of political and religious finesse.

His aim with the International Year of Tibet, as it came to be known, was to "blitz the planet with Tibetan spiritual energy." Gere outlined his "mystical vision" at a Tibet Movement conference in 1990:

> We want to create a context to make Tibet extraordinary news politically, culturally, and spiritually. We want to make Tibet cross-over. . . . Almost all of us are dharma people, tantric people, we are talking about a new universe, a new order. We plan to hold a Kalachakra [Buddhist ceremony] in New York City in October 1991, and a museum show called Wisdom and Compassion . . . we plan to bombard New York, which is the political and media capital of the world. (Field notes)

Gere described a series of programs that would run throughout the year, stressing the "in-your-face" quality for which he was aiming: "We are selling Tibet . . . what is important about the Year of Tibet is its PR aspect, the awareness it raises."

Gere's dream of "blitzing" Manhattan with "Tibetan spiritual energy" came true in October 1991 with the arrival of the Dalai Lama and the aforementioned high lamas from India to give teachings and initiations. In addition, a Tibetan Buddhist art exhibition opened at the IBM Gallery, and monks made an accompanying sand mandala in full view of the street traffic on Madison Avenue. Other major events included a public talk by the Dalai Lama, an interfaith concert at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, a symposium on Tibet at the Asia Society, and a "sunrise meditation for world peace" in Central Park, as well as film festivals, photographic exhibitions, television documentaries, and screenings on the SONY Jumbotron in Times Square—all dedicated to Tibet. Dance, chanting, and butter sculpture "performances" by monks from different lineages in venues around the city rounded out the month's activities.

From the outset, Gere conceived of the Year of Tibet as a spectacle in the service of politics. His aim, and the project of Tibet House as a whole, was to stage cultural and religious events and in so doing to transform audiences interested in Buddhism into political supporters. As one employee at Tibet House put it:

> The way I see Tibet House is, it's like a gameboard, we pull everyone in and then educate them and then we send them off to do the real work, which is in the Office of Tibet and the Campaign for Tibet, that's the real work. . . . Tibet House is the point of entry for . . . broadening the grassroots base of support here and perhaps internationally as well. The easiest door of entry for the regular American with money is the culture, is to fall in love with Tibet through seeing the beauty of Tibet's culture. (Field notes)

The discourse of cultural survival that underpins this mode of mobilization is a far cry from that of the 1960s and 1970s when the Dalai Lama was barred from entering the United States and the Tibet issue was framed in terms of anticolonialism and independence by exile leaders and intellectuals based in India. It is a much "softer" discourse that has had unintended and contradictory consequences for the activists who have deployed it. Yet it is important to note that Tibetans themselves have long viewed their Buddhist culture as an asset and a potentially important resource in international politics. Indeed, the use of Buddhism to secure the protection of outsiders has deep historical roots, having been a central means through which the Tibetan state established and maintained relations with its more powerful neighbors for three centuries. The use of Buddhism in contemporary times to engage both Western individuals and publics, as illustrated in the Year of Tibet, is simply an extension of this practice (McLagan 1996). This point highlights Tibetans' complicity in their own objectification. It also underscores the fact that Tibetans themselves do not necessarily view the circulation of Buddhism in the West as commodification in the same way that Western critics of the phenomenon appear to. For religiously minded leaders like the Dalai Lama who stress the importance of "saving" Tibetan culture not only for Tibetans but for all humanity, the need to embed their nationalist claims within a more universalistic framework in accordance with basic tenets of Mahayana Buddhism has compelled them to self-consciously adopt a narrative of Tibetanness which—as it has been embraced by activists like Richard Gere—unfortunately has tended to reinforce and perpetuate Western stereotypes and fantasies of Tibetans rather than provide representations of them as historical actors with serious and legitimate political claims. This point was brought home to me by an incident during my fieldwork.

One afternoon in October 1991, I was sitting in the Manhattan office of Tibet House. The office was abuzz with anticipation because Richard Gere was scheduled to arrive soon to do an interview and photo session with a reporter from *Women's Wear Daily (WWD)* about the Year of Tibet. When he arrived, Gere was shown into an office on the second floor of the brownstone that housed Tibet House and several Tibetan-run nongovernmental organizations. The reporter from *WWD* interviewed the actor, and at the end of the interview, when it came time for a photograph to be taken, Gere asked that it be taken with a monk. Unsurprisingly, there were no monks working in the "Tibet building," and Gere had to settle for the highest-status layperson around, who happened to be the Dalai Lama's representative in North America. After Gere left the building, one of the Tibetan women with whom I worked came upstairs and exclaimed with great annoyance to the non-Tibetans sitting around the room, "We're not all monks you know!!"

In the context of a political campaign, Gere's commitment to Buddhism and his sense of what would signify Tibetanness for the magazine's readers—i.e., a monk—demonstrates the contradictions inherent in this form of activism. On the one hand, the celebrity component of the Year of Tibet enabled activists to engage with the image-based, publicity-driven discursive structures of American mass-mediated politics by connecting them with a category of social actors who have a huge amount of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1993), and who are intimately involved with processes of producing spectacle and managing media on a daily basis. It brought the Tibet issue to the attention of a wider range of the American public—such as *Women's Wear Daily*'s readers—than ever before and set the trend for the cultural extravaganzas that followed and became the Movement's main mode of activism in the 1990s.[9]

On the other hand, celebrity involvement has allowed the Tibet issue to be defined by its religiosity, given that most celebrities, like Gere, are drawn to the struggle through their interest in Buddhism rather than by its political content. This has annoyed many activists, especially young lay Tibetans in exile who, despite their willing participation in the objectification of Tibetan culture, find the privileging of Buddhism at the expense of other identities Tibetans carry to be profoundly constraining.

As more and more celebrities have embraced the Tibetan cause, the issue has received a lot of publicity, though not necessarily targeted media coverage, that might lead to a meaningful political outcome (see Barnett 1998 for a discussion of this point). This is because Tibet-related events attended by celebrities have tended to be framed in terms of the celebrities' stardom, rather than the issue at hand. For example, Gere's stardom tends to overwhelm his own real political interest in Tibet; the narratives that circulate about him make interesting fodder for entertainment stories but get in the way of the political communication that activists, including Gere himself, ultimately seek. One consequence of this is that as the mainstream American public sphere has been increasingly saturated with stories and images of glamorous celebrity-oriented Tibet events, the desire to dismiss the issue *because* of the famous people with whom it is associated has grown and at times even made the issue an object of parody.

There are many examples of how overexposure of the Tibet issue has led to a kind of cultural backlash in the United States. For example, the announcement in 1997 that the action film star Steven Seagal was recognized by a high lama in India as a *tulku* generated a wave of cynicism in the press.[10] Overexposure has become a problem for the Dalai Lama as well. Another observer, lamenting the Dalai Lama's appearance on CNN's *Larry King Live!* New Year's Eve show on December 31, 1999, argued that the Tibetan leader is overexposed in the West, this despite the fact that he was asked by King what he, "as a leading Muslim," thought of the millennium celebrations. Claiming this blooper as evidence of the danger popular overexposure poses to the Tibetan leader's moral stature, a Canadian newspaper columnist opined: "The message of the Dalai Lama may be sound, but the medium is en route to perversion. You simply can't plop down a monk in the midst of the gilded cultural establishment without the ironies colliding. The kitsch factor becomes too hard to ignore. The charisma starts to crumble from Too Much Information" (Govani 2000).

MANAGING THE DALAI LAMA

The Dalai Lama's willingness to participate in the various cultural spectacles that have been mounted since 1989 in the United States, cemented by his relationship to his student Richard Gere, has been crucial to efforts by activists to focus public attention on the Tibet issue. As the number of his visits to the United States has multiplied, his presence in the popular imagination has grown, and he has been transformed into a pop icon of sorts. He has been embraced by movie stars, rock musicians, and other public personalities; his life has been depicted in Hollywood films such as Martin Scorsese's *Kundun* and the Brad Pitt star vehicle *Seven Years in Tibet,* both released in 1997; his image has appeared on billboards and in magazines; and his face has adorned posters in bookstore windows as his latest books, the *Art of Happiness* (1998), *Ethics for a New Millennium* (1999), and *The Path to Tranquillity* (1999), shot to the top of the *New York Times* bestseller list. He has even become a screen saver.[11]

Despite this ubiquity, popular understanding of the Dalai Lama and Tibet's recent political history remains simplistic, as the all-too-common reference to the Tibetan leader as a "god-king" in the press reveals. The complex nature of the Dalai Lama's personage and the Tibetan political system he embodies pose all sorts of problems of translation, particularly for the diverse actors who constitute the Tibet Movement who must work collectively to render political discourse meaningful across cultural frameworks in order to make the Movement politically visible. He is the head of both a transnational political movement and a government-in-exile as well as an emanation of Avalokitesvara (Skt.), the Buddha of compassion and the protector deity of Tibet. It is difficult to communicate his dual status as a living Buddha and worldly political leader to audiences unfamiliar with him, especially to members of the Western media who are generally ignorant about the intertwining of religion and politics that defines the Tibetan system and challenges their own fundamental cultural categories.

Before 1991, Tibetan political leaders based in the United States had been wary of the American media (despite their generally positive treatment by the press); they worked with a Washington-based media consultant on an ad hoc basis when the Dalai Lama was in town but otherwise resisted advice that they hire a full-time consultant. But the decision to hold the Year of Tibet raised concerns about how the Dalai Lama would be handled and what effect such publicity would have on the Movement's political goals. To allay these fears expressed by Tibetan political leaders based in the United States as well as the Dalai Lama's American advisers, Gere decided to hire Jane Kelly (a pseudonym), a respected media consultant with a long history of media-related human rights advocacy and a reputation for intelligence and sensitivity.

Although the management of meaning is a fundamental aspect of the political process in all societies, in liberal democratic countries media managers, political consultants, and other PR experts have become highly specialized players in the political sphere over the past few decades. They provide the symbols and frameworks through which political action is constituted and legitimized in the mass media. As Marshall (1997: 206) argues, in the process of legitimation, these frameworks use affect to turn politicians into public personalities, or celebrities, through their intense focus on the personal, the intimate, and the individual qualities of leadership. This particularly American narrative of political leadership (which media consultants such as James Carville are increasingly exporting to other countries) is based on a certain instrumental notion of political efficacy, one that assumes a self-interested and calculated motivation behind all action (see Nagourney 1999).

The cultural specificity of the narratives of leadership preferred by Western media consultants was highlighted vividly in discussions among activists in strategy meetings about the Dalai Lama's public actions and whether they would be construed as political during the Year of Tibet. In these discussions, different understandings of how political power is constructed emerged, with Kelly representing the Western media point of view and certain activists—both Tibetan and non-Tibetan—representing a more "traditional" Tibetan perspective. Western assumptions about political efficacy involve seeing people act. The Dalai Lama and the political system he personifies exemplify a different discourse of power that has a long history and is not organized around the seemingly transparent exercise of power. In the Tibetan system, certain people are believed to have extraordinary powers; they can see and even act in realms normally concealed from view. The individuals raised under this system, as the Dalai Lama was, believe the world is populated by invisible forces. Thus, for instance, in addition to making decisions based on instrumental political concerns, the Tibetan leader acts based on consultations with oracles, dreams, and "certain feelings," as one activist put it. Decisions based on "feelings" are inexplicable according to the logic that prevails in Western political discourse, which is designed to augment the authority and legitimacy of the political leader.

This point was made clear in an anecdote told by one of the Dalai Lama's representatives at a post–Year of Tibet strategy meeting. In response to Kelly's assertion that media coverage would have improved if activists had "packaged" the Tibetan leader better, the Tibetan representative pointed out that the Dalai Lama had a "distinctive" way of doing things:

> Like for instance, when he was invited to Washington, he also accepted an invitation from a small college in Findlay, Ohio. The people in Findlay, they were shocked to find out His Holiness is visiting here, a small town, and someone from Findlay called me to say—why is His Holiness choosing Findlay as part of his visit? . . . He visits Washington, Boston, New York, not a really small town in Ohio. What does he want to accomplish by visiting a small town?

The group of activists sitting around the table laughed heartily as he continued:

> I'm telling you, His Holiness does not judge what he can accomplish by coming to a place; of course we do have several invitations, and out of several, he just picks one. And he thinks that perhaps by visiting this particular university he can benefit those who have invited him. Of course, we try to make recommendations, but then he doesn't go through the recommendations; he has his own choices. (Field notes)

According to his representatives, the Dalai Lama justifies his choices in terms of his Buddhist conviction that his primary purpose is to provide spiritual benefit to those with whom he comes into contact. His deep commitment and unconventional ways were further underscored by the representative's second anecdote:

> When the Nobel Peace Prize was announced . . . we were in Newport Beach, California. And we had calls from all the media networks, including Diane Sawyer, who wanted to interview His Holiness. We went to His Holiness and said that we have a lot of demand for the interview. Then he said there is no time. Just bring the schedule. And we got the schedule and there were some unimportant meetings and then we suggested that we could cancel a few of them. He said, look, no matter whether these are important or not, we have committed to meet these people three months back. Now how could I say that I have more important work to do and cancel these and give an interview? I can't do that. He said that if there is any time left over after the meeting, we are free to schedule. But of course after meeting these people there was no time.

These anecdotes reveal how, as the embodiment of different principles, the Dalai Lama presents a complicated, even at times unruly, figure who sometimes does not follow his own script, not to mention those of his handlers. Moreover, they suggest why the Tibetan leader has been perceived in the West as having a kind of moral authority that other politicians lack; his apparent lack of political calculation in seeking media coverage (at least in 1991) and his unrehearsed, often awkward off-the-cuff performances in broken English when he does appear in the news media (along with his consistent message of nonviolence) is taken as a sign of the Dalai Lama's authenticity, which in turn gives him a legitimacy in the eyes of many of his followers.

FRAMING THE KALACHAKRA

The Kalachakra was by far the biggest and most visible event that took place in New York during the Year of Tibet. Eight days long, it was attended by some four thousand people, including Gere and his then-wife, Cindy Crawford, and many other members of the New York social elite.

The Kalachakra is a tantric initiation, a complex ritual that represents in many ways the pinnacle of Buddhist esotericism (Sopa, Jackson, and Newman 1985: 91). Buddhist empowerments into particular tantras occur through an initiation that involves extensive visualizations, prayers, offerings, and the use of ritual implements and substances. In order for the guru, in this case the Dalai Lama, to conduct such an empowerment, he must take on the qualities of the deity himself or herself. Then through a series of consecrations, he transfers his power and blessing or *chin lab* to the student. During the empowerment, the Dalai Lama sits on a large colorful throne surrounded by monks and nuns (who sit at the outer perimeter of the stage); three enormous *thangkas* (painted scrolls) hang behind him and a brightly painted "mandala house" sits stage left. The audience wears red cloth blindfolds, and at various times throughout the ritual the Dalai Lama puts on and takes off a fringed yellow hat. To Tibetans and non-Tibetans alike, it is a fantastic spectacle, a locus of religious communitas, a social occasion.

The Dalai Lama's decision to participate in such an event threw diverse members of the Movement into conflict. For the activists who were Buddhists, the Dalai Lama's stature as a political leader rests entirely on his moral authority as a Buddhist teacher, and thus his participation in a tantric ritual posed no interpretive problem whatsoever. It was simply the Dalai Lama doing what he does best. Others, however, including media consultant Kelly and the political advisers who had been working since 1987 to help the Tibetan leader create a political presence on the world stage, believed that the publicity generated by holding such an event in the "political and media capital of the world," as Gere put it, would be a liability rather than an advantage. These individuals feared that having the Dalai Lama sitting on an elaborate throne with a fringed yellow hat and talking an audience through a series of esoteric visualizations for eight days in the heart of New York City would merely create images of the Tibetan leader that would reinforce exotic stereotypes about Tibetans, confuse his political supporters, and produce feature stories about the celebrity Buddhists in attendance instead of generating hard news coverage of the Tibetan situation.

Tension among members of the Movement became clear during the Year of Tibet, especially in the weeks preceding the Kalachakra while I was working as a volunteer at Tibet House, the nerve center of the Year of Tibet campaign. Upon hearing that a Kalachakra initiation was scheduled to take place in October in Manhattan, several unofficial advisers to the Tibetan government-in-exile, all of them Westerners, attempted to pressure organizers into canceling the event. In an interview, one of the organizers of the Kalachakra named Jean recalled that "their main argument was that he [the Dalai Lama] would be too visible, that it is not in His Holiness's interests to be seen as a spiritual leader, as a religious person, that it would jeopardize his credibility as a political leader on the world stage, and couldn't we do this somewhere out in the country someplace?" This effect might be further exaggerated, the advisers argued, by the fact that the initiation was scheduled to coincide with the opening of the UN General Assembly. Comparing the Tibetan leader to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, they told the organizers: "Although Desmond Tutu is a religious figure, you would never see him doing a religious service. His basic persona is political. You never see him in a weird hat or carrying a staff or doing anything strange."

These comments reveal some of the debates that emerged around how to represent the Dalai Lama in order to render him a more transparent figure legible within the context of Western political representation. These debates, which divided participants along Buddhist/non-Buddhist lines rather than Tibetan/non-Tibetan lines, became a powerful undercurrent during the planning and actual staging of the Kalachakra.

It is interesting to note that discussions of Tibetan legibility centered on visual imagery. Many theorists, from Lippmann ([1922] 1954) to Barthes (1977, 1981) to Mitchell (1994) to Virilio (1991), have commented on the modern tendency to picture or visualize existence. Thus it is not surprising that visuality is a medium in which politics are conducted in a public sphere that is mainly constituted by forms of mass spectacle and the mediatization of experience. As Mirzoeff (1999: 12) argues, "Visuality does not replace discourse but makes it more comprehensible, quicker, and more effective."

Some have argued that the visual is dangerous—that it is too open to misinterpretation.[12] Photographs contain too many meanings, their sensual immediacy is too engaging, and there is much excess meaning that is not easily controlled, a fact clearly recognized by activists who worried over how images of the Dalai Lama conducting a Buddhist ritual would be read. I heard Kelly herself make the point over and over to activists that "media do not understand through explanation; they understand through pictures." Indeed, she worked extremely hard to contain press access to the initiation, limiting the number of photographers and making sure they took photos at specified times, in part out of respect for the solemnity of the occasion, but also out of a desire to curtail the production of images of the Dalai Lama "wearing funny hats."

Once plans to hold the Kalachakra initiation were finalized, organizers had to decide how to frame the event in the overall context of the Year of Tibet. In the past, Kalachakra initiations in the United States (in 1981 in Madison, Wisconsin; in 1989 in Santa Monica, California) had been advertised only within American Buddhist and Tibetan circles, where presumably people understood what they meant. In this instance, however, the tantric initiation was intended for a primarily non-Buddhist audience. The job of managing the media coverage of the event initially fell to Jane Kelly. Part of her job entailed reconciling competing interests and opinions among activists. To do this, Kelly frequently brought the Dalai Lama's representative to North America together with representatives from Tibet support organizations such as Tibet House, the Tibet Center, the Tibet Fund, and the International Campaign for Tibet. Through regular consultations, Kelly decided on a media strategy that would attempt to tie Tibetan culture, politics, and religion together. However, Kelly's job became more complicated when, only three weeks before the Kalachakra initiation, Richard Gere hired a public relations firm, Livet Reichart, to handle it as a separate event. When I asked Tibet House's executive director why Gere had decided to hire Livet Reichart so late in the day, she explained:

> At one point Richard panicked. He put in a hell of a lot of money and they'd only sold one third of the seats and he said, we need more pre-event publicity. Jane Kelly isn't getting it, I need somebody who is going to go to the *Post*, to the shitty newspapers, and get publicity. So he brought in Livet Reichart, who, of course, thought they were going to be able to monopolize everything. . . . Jane had begun all the processes, it was all ready to happen, but Richard didn't have the patience to wait.

In the early 1990s, Livet Reichart was a firm well known for its celebrity clients and art-world connections. Unlike Jane Kelly, whose approach represented PR in the service of politics, Livet Reichart epitomized PR in the service of spectacle. That is, their main goal was to generate as much short-term media coverage of the Kalachakra as possible, regardless of its political consequences or implications.

If Tibet House wanted to attract average Americans to the Tibet issue through relatively apolitical cultural spectacles, Livet Reichart explicitly attempted to attract people to the initiation through the Dalai Lama's association with Richard Gere. The firm began planting stories and photographs linking Richard Gere to the Dalai Lama in newspapers and magazines. For



Richard Gere speaking at the March for Tibet rally, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2000. (Photo: Sonam Zoksang)

example, in the October 10, 1991, "Chronicle" column of the *New York Times*, Nadine Brozan wrote a piece titled: "Richard Gere Follows the Dalai Lama." The story quoted Gere as saying, "I have been planning this for four years . . . it took years to get Tibet House going and the last year to crank up for the Year of Tibet, and now it's a 20-hour-a-day gig." On that same day, William Norwich (1991) wrote a piece about the Dalai Lama in the *New York Post*, noting, "Where goes the Dalai Lama these days so goes Richard Gere . . . and the actor's significant other, Cindy Crawford." Stressing the celebrity appeal of the Dalai Lama, the article named a number of famous artists and society figures who planned to attend Year of Tibet events in New York. Around the same time, an article appeared in another newspaper gossip column about the legal feud between John Avedon (son of photographer Richard Avedon) and his former wife, Elizabeth, who had left her husband for Richard Gere a few years earlier. The article mentioned that all three were followers of the Dalai Lama and were involved with Tibet House. Deeply offended, one Tibetan complained: "To put the Dalai Lama in the center of that story is disgusting." Other Livet Reichart–generated stories included: "Dalai High: Richard Gere's Intoxicant of Choice Is Tibet" in *Women's Wear Daily* (Ryan 1991); "Gere-ing Up for the Guru" in *New York Live* (Hays 1991); and "Tibet Festival in High Gere" (Farolino 1991).

In the end, Livet Reichart's success in selling out the Kalachakra event

undermined the overall media strategy for the Year of Tibet. As Tibet House then-executive director recalled: "Jane [Kelly] thought that the media should focus on different aspects, not on Richard and how he loves Tibet and his career and so on, which is obviously the way we were going to get more press, but Jane thought it was the wrong type of press." Kelly had decided previously not to advertise the Kalachakra in the newspaper, preferring instead to highlight the Tibetan leaders' less esoteric programs, including an ecumenical service at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. She felt the advertisements worked against the impression she was trying to create of the Tibetan leader as a world spiritual leader and statesman; by inviting non-Buddhists to attend, she felt the Tibetan leader might appear to be proseletyzing and that this would send a conflicting message to the media.

Many Tibetans in New York objected to the publicists' attempts to link the Tibetan leader with Gere. The ones I interviewed, mainly young exiles, worried that such an association would diminish their revered leader's status and detract from Americans' recognition of his sincere motivation and spiritual accomplishments. At the time, rumors about Gere's supposed sexual proclivities were circulating in the American tabloids, a fact that only added to my informants' anxieties.

Other Tibetans complained that the ads for the Kalachakra made it appear to be a sort of "show" starring the Dalai Lama. As one young man complained to me in an interview:

> The teachings are not a show, and while the Dalai Lama has to operate within this environment, here it's something that is taken out of a cultural context and put in something totally alien. . . . For Tibetans in India or Tibet, if a lama gives a teaching, that teaching is viewed in the same way as the teacher views the teaching, which is something very religious, it's not just something Hollywood. Some Americans think the Dalai Lama comes and for them it is a show, and the Dalai Lama is nothing other than a Hollywood actor doing his piece and leaving the stage. But for a Tibetan he's not an actor, he's trying to help you attain enlightenment.

My friend's observation exemplifies the sorts of concerns about the loss of control over their representation that many Tibetans experience once they decide to objectify themselves through mass culture circuits (McLagan 1997), concerns that tend to focus on the Dalai Lama, whose presumed divinity makes him the object of intense feelings of devotion from his people. Ironically, as his stature as a global guru has grown, the Dalai Lama indeed has crossed over and become a celebrity in American terms in much the same way that he is in the Tibetan world. Yet I would argue that instead of transforming the Dalai Lama into a commodity and evacuating him of any meaning, the mass mediation of the Dalai Lama, if anything, has "re-auraticized" him, a fact attested to by his current popularity as a spiritual teacher in the West.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, social movement theorists have argued that in the contemporary era social movements must be seen as cultural struggles in a fundamental sense, as struggles over meanings as much as over political or economic conditions (see, e.g., Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Fox and Starn 1997; Touraine 1988). These struggles involve symbolic processes that are mediated in ever more complex ways. How does cultural difference play into this mediation process, and what difference does it make, after all? As I have described, if they want to achieve visibility, activists must fit themselves into Western media frames, which require certain kinds of performances in order for the action to be read as politically meaningful in Western terms. I take the social practices involved in managing this difference through media forms that cross cultural boundaries to be a vital form of cultural production that remains little understood outside of media circles. By paying ethnographic attention to the mechanics by which stories are put into circulation, via press conferences, press releases, publicity tours, and quiet words with journalists, as well as the backstage negotiations through which these stories are formulated in the first place, one can defamiliarize what for many are apparently familiar yet unexamined cultural practices. In so doing, one emphasizes the mediating role that such social practices play in the way media and "culture" are deployed in the production of contemporary politics.

At the same time, we must ask, from what position do Tibetans manipulate and rescript Western media-political practices to serve their own political ends? From what experiential or cultural reserves do Tibetan political practices and historical consciousness in the diaspora emerge? In the case of the Tibet Movement, I want to argue, contrary to many observers, that immersion into First World media technologies and publicity circuits does not automatically imply co-optation of Tibetans or the Tibet issue, as my discussion of the Dalai Lama reveals (see also McLagan 1996).

To be sure, there is a high cost for this form of mediated activism, as scholars such as Turner and Prins (this volume) have documented in the case of indigenous peoples, and Barnett (1998) has argued in relation to the Tibet issue. But media effects are notoriously hard to trace; research has largely failed to demonstrate that media have any kind of direct or predictable effects on people.[13] Thus, for instance, it is hard to know exactly how contemporary Tibetan activism has affected American foreign policy toward Tibet and China. One thing is clear, though: we need to think about the mobilization of cultural difference differently. We should not think about the strategic objectification of culture solely in terms of commodification and consumption; rather we need to inflect our analysis with a more complicated understanding of what it means to the various actors involved and what is at stake for them.

This point is most evident in the case of the Kalachakra, which, as a mass-mediated cultural spectacle, had a certain efficacy that the media consultants, public relations experts, and political advisers failed to address or understand. For Tibetans and other Buddhists, rituals such as the Kalachakra achieve their efficacy through audience participation; they are not passively received but are understood in an active sense to bring blessings, if not spiritual insight, to participants. In other words, being in the presence of the lama, seeing the lama, and being seen by the lama is a transformative experience, a belief that parallels the concept of *darshan* in Hindu worship.[14] At the root of the issue, then, are the very different understandings that Tibetan Buddhists and non-Buddhists have of the efficacy of visual spectacle. Similarly, from the Dalai Lama's point of view, participation in the Kalachakra could be construed as a spiritual benefit—for those in attendance at the event as well as for humanity at large—a fact linked to this particular tantra's eschatology as having a "special connection with all the people of this planet" (see McLagan 1996). By teasing out these differences and their specific meanings in social context, we can better understand the persistence of alternative forms of publicity and political subjectivity in Western mass-mediated contexts as well as the sites where they might productively intersect with others' agendas.

NOTES

The field research on which this paper is based was funded by the Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. The Bunting Institute at Radcliffe College provided crucial time and support for writing. Many thanks for the stimulating comments on the substance of my argument from my fellow "sisters" at the Bunting (1998–99), especially Neta Crawford, and from my colleagues in the Tibetan studies world, Robbie Barnett and Georges Dreyfus. Thanks also to Sonam Zoksang, New York–based Tibet activist and photographer, for the use of his photographs and to Leo Hsu, who helped in their preparation for publication. Finally, I am indebted to my editors Faye Ginsburg and Lila Abu-Lughod for their patience and insightful feedback, and especially to Brian Larkin, who soldiered through many versions of this essay, graciously taking precious time away from his own work to offer invaluable intellectual criticism and support.

1. Debord (1967) analyzes the penetration of the commodity form into mass communication, which he argues results in the spectacle. There is a long tradition of work in political science on political spectacle; see, e.g., Edelman 1988; or more recently Wedeen's work on spectacle in Syria (1999).

2. McAdam (1996) reminds us that mobilization and ongoing collective action are social accomplishments. He argues that the concept of framing draws attention toward the everyday signifying activity of activism that has been largely overlooked in social movement theory.

3. For other interesting case studies of intercultural activism, see Stoll 1997 and Landsman and Krasniewicz 1990.

4. Among the more colorful popular books written recently on political communication in the United States and England are Jones 1995; Michie 1998; Morris 1996; Routledge 1999; Tye 1998; and Stephanopoulos 1999. Some of the more discerning academic work on the subject of political communication includes McNair 1998, 1999; Ewen 1996; Maltese 1994; and Kahana 1999.

5. For an analysis of the historical events before and after 1959, see Shakya 1999.

6. See Knaus 1999 and the documentary film *The Shadow Circus* by Tenzing Sonam and Ritu Sarin (1998) for accounts of covert American involvement with the Tibetan resistance movement.

7. For descriptions and analyses of these events, see Barnett and Akiner 1994 and Schwartz 1994.

8. Richard Gere has a long-standing interest in humanitarian and human rights issues, which he supports through the Gere Foundation. Over time, Gere has given large sums of money to the Dalai Lama's exile government and Tibetan organizations in India and the United States. In the spring of 1999, Gere was reported to have visited refugee camps in Macedonia, where he met with Kosovar Albanian refugees. See "www.tibetcenter.org/gere.html" for more information on the foundation's work.

9. See Crosby and Bender 2000 for a personal history of musical activism from the 1960s to the present.

10. Seagal, a longtime Buddhist practitioner, was recognized by a high Nyingma lama based in India as a reincarnated lama. See 1997 interview in the Buddhist newspaper *Shambhala Sun*: http://www.maavwik.simplenet.com/seagal/nov97interview.html.

11. When asked what he thought about this development, the Dalai Lama is reported by the Associated Press to have said, "I don't mind. People can use me as they want. My main practice is to serve human beings." Quoted in *World Tibet Network News*, August 29, 1999.

12. There is a vast literature on the photographic image, including Sontag 1989 and Barthes 1972, 1977, and 1981.

13. See, for example, David Gauntlett's (1998) critique of the "effects model" in media studies.

14. See Eck 1981 for a discussion of the concept of *darshan*.

REFERENCES

Altschull, J. Herbert. 1995. *Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs*. New York: Longman.

Alvarez, Sonia, Eva Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar, eds. 1998. *Culture of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Revisioning Latin American Social Movements*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: The Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Barnett, Robert. 1998. Essay. In *The Tibetans*, edited by Steve Lehman. New York: Umbrage Editions.

Barnett, Robert, and Shirin Akiner, eds. 1994. *Resistance and Reform in Tibet*. London: Hurst.

Barthes, Roland. 1972. *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang.

———. 1977. *Image, Music, Text*. Translated by Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang.

———. 1981. *Camera Lucida*. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Noonday Press.

Boorstin, Daniel J. 1961. *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America*. New York: Atheneum.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993. *The Field of Cultural Production*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Burke, Peter. 1992. *The Fabrication of Louis XIV.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Conklin, Beth. 1995. Body Paint, Feathers, and VCRs: Aesthetics and Authenticity in Amazonian Activism. *American Ethnologist* 24 (4): 711–47.

Crosby, David, and David Bender. 2000. *Stand and Be Counted: Making Music, Making History*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco.

Debord, Guy. 1967. *The Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit: Black and Red.

Eck, Diana. [1981] 1998. *Darshan: Seeing the Divine Image in India*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Edelman, Murray. 1988. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ewen, Stuart. 1996. *P.R.! A Social History of Spin*. 2d ed. New York: Basic Books.

Farolino, Audrey. 1991. Tibet Festival in High Gere. *New York Post*, October 11.

Foucault, Michel. 1979. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Fox, Richard, and Orin Starn, eds. 1997. *Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Gauntlett, David. 1998. Ten Things Wrong with the "Effects Model." In *Approaches to Audiences: A Reader*, edited by Roger Dickinson, Ramaswani Harindranath, and Olga Linne. London: Arnold.

Goldstein, Melvyn. 1997. *The Dragon and the Snow Lion: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Govani, Shirin. 2000. Revere the Dalai Lama as If He Were Royalty. *National Post* (Canada), January 5. Reprinted in *World Tibet News*, January 7, 2000.

Gyatso, Tenzin. 1998. *The Art of Happiness*. New York: Riverhead Books.

———. 1999a. *Ethics for a New Millennium*. New York: Riverhead Books.

———. 1999b. *The Path to Tranquillity*. New York: Viking.

Hays, Charlotte. 1991. Gere-ing Up for the Guru. *New York Live*, October 13, p. 15.

Jones, Nicholas. 1995. *Soundbites and Spin Doctors: How Politicians Manipulate the Media and Vice Versa*. London: Indigo Press.

Kahana, Jonathan. 1999. The Reception of Politics: Publicity and Its Parasites. *Social Text* 58 (17): 93–109.

Knaus, Kenneth. 1999. *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival.* New York: Public Affair Books.

Landsman, Gail, and Louise Krasniewicz. 1990. "A Native Man Is Still a Man": A Case Study of Intercultural Participation in Social Movements. *Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly* 15 (1): 11–19.

Lippmann, Walter. [1922] 1954. *Public Opinion.* New York: Macmillan.

Lopez, Donald. 1994. "New Age Orientalism: The Case of Tibet." *Tibetan Review* (May): 16–20.

———. 1998. *Prisoners of Shangri-la: Tibetan Buddhism and the West.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Maltese, John. 1994. *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Marshall, P. David. 1997. *Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McAdam, Douglas. 1996. The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements,* edited by Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

McLagan, Meg. 1996. Mobilizing for Tibet: Transnational Politics and Diaspora Culture in the Post–Cold War Era. Ph.D. diss., Department of Anthropology, New York University.

———. 1997. Mystical Visions in Manhattan: Deploying Culture in the Year of Tibet. In *Tibetan Culture in the Diaspora,* edited by Frank Korom. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences.

McNair, Brian. 1998. *Introduction to the Sociology of Journalism.* London: Edward Arnold.

———. 1999. *Introduction to Political Communication.* 2d ed. London: Routledge.

Meyrowitz, Joshua. 1985. *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Michie, David. 1998. *The Invisible Persuaders: How Britain's Spin Doctors Manipulate the Media.* London: Bantam Press.

Mirzoeff, Nicholas. 1999. *An Introduction to Visual Culture.* New York: Routledge.

Mitchell, W. J. T. 1994. *Picture Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morris, Dick. 1996. *Behind the Oval Office.* New York: Random House.

Myers, Fred. 1994. Culture Making: Performing Aboriginality at the Asia Society Gallery. *American Ethnologist* 21 (4): 679–99.

Nagourney, Adam. 1999. Have Attack Ad, Will Travel. *New York Times Magazine,* April 25: 42–48, 61, 70.

Norwich, William. 1991. Column. *New York Post,* October 10.

Ortner, Sherry. 1997. Introduction. *Representations,* special issue on Clifford Geertz, 59: 1–13.

Routledge, Paul. 1999. *Mandy: The Unauthorized Biography of Peter Mandelson.* London: Simon and Schuster.

Ryan, Kimberley. 1991. Dalai High: Richard Gere's Intoxicant of Choice Is Tibet. *Women's Wear Daily,* October 25–November 4: 7–8.

Schwartz, Ronald. 1994. *Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Shakya, Tsering. 1999. *Dragon in the Land of Snows.* London: Pimlico Press.

Sontag, Susan. 1989. *On Photography.* New York: Anchor Books.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundub, Roger Jackson, and John Newman. 1985. *The Wheel of Time: The Kalachakra in Context.* Madison, Wisc.: Deer Park Books.

Stephanopoulos, George. 1999. *All Too Human: A Political Education.* New York: Little, Brown.

Stoll, David. 1997. To Whom Should We Listen? Human Rights Activism in Two Guatemalan Land Disputes. In *Human Rights: Culture and Context,* edited by Richard Wilson. London: Pluto Press.

Touraine, Alain. 1988. *Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Turner, Terence. 1993. Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What Is Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful Of? *Cultural Anthropology* 8 (4): 411–29.

Tye, Larry. 1998. *The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations.* New York: Crown.

Virilio, Paul. 1991. *The Aesthetics of Disappearance.* Translated by Philip Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e).

Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.